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INTRODUCTION:




In the spring of 2009, the University of Notre Dame invited
President Obama to deliver the May 2009 commencement
address and receive an honorary doctor of laws degree. The
invitation followed a particularly heated campaign season in
which many Catholic communities experienced lacerating
divisions over the question of whether a Catholic could vote for a
"pro-choice" politician-namely, Senator Barack Obama. To put
it mildly, the decision to honor President Obama sparked an
intense, nationwide controversy.
The president of Notre Dame, Holy Cross Father John I.
Jenkins described the rationale for the choice:
We will honor Mr. Obama as an inspiring leader who faces
many challenges-the economy, . . . immigration [,] and
education reform-and is addressing them with intelligence,
courage[, and honesty. It is of special significance that we will
hear from our first African-American [P]resident, a person who
has spoken eloquently and movingly about race in this nation.
Racial prejudice has been a deep wound in America, and Mr.
Obama has been a healer.'
Others, however, focused on Mr. Obama's legacy as a "pro-
abortion legislator."2 Writing to Father Jenkins "to protest this
egregious decision," Archbishop Nienstedt of St. Paul and
t Visiting Lecturer, Georgetown University School of Law; Director, Institute on
Religion, Law and Lawyer's Work, Fordham University School of Law (2001 - July
2011). The author wishes to thank Howard Lesnick and Russell Pearce, and all of
the authors of this Symposium for thoughtful discussions on this topic and
comments in the draft.
I Father John I. Jenkins, CSC et al., Statements on Notre Dame's Invitation of
President Obama to Speak at Graduation, 38 ORIGINS 693, 693-94 (2009)
[hereinafter Statements on Notre Dame's Invitation].
2 Id. at 697 (statement of Archbishop John C. Nienstedt).
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Minneapolis expressed his concern that Mr. Obama "has
indicated, especially since he took office, his deliberate disregard
of the unborn by lifting the ban on embryonic stem-cell research,
by promoting the Freedom of Choice Act agenda and by his open
support for gay rights throughout this country."3
In their critiques of the invitation, several bishops indicated
that a 2004 statement of the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops, Catholics in Political Life, should have
provided fairly straightforward guidance-at least on the
question of whom not to honor. The relevant portion of the
statement reads: "The Catholic community and Catholic
institutions should not honor those who act in defiance of our
fundamental moral principles. They should not be given awards,
honors[,] or platforms which would suggest support for their
actions."'
Bishop John M. D'Arcy of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Indiana,
the diocese in which the University of Notre Dame is located,
quoted the 2004 directive in his letter informing Father Jenkins
of his decision not to attend the graduation ceremony: "[T]he
measure of any Catholic institution is not only what it stands for,
but also what it will not stand for."5 Bishop Thomas G. Doran of
Rockford, Illinois also wrote to express his "dismay and outrage"
to an invitation which "flies in the face of the expressed directive
of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops in the year 2004 that
Catholic institutions not so honor those who profess opposition to
the church's doctrine on abortion and embryonic stem-cell
research."6  Similarly, Bishop Thomas J. Olmstead of Phoenix
defined the invitation as "a public act of disobedience to the
bishops of the United States."'
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS ET AL., Catholics in Political Life,
http://www.usccb.org/bishops/catholicsinpoliticallife.shtml (last visited July 28,
2011) [hereinafter Catholics in Political Life] (emphasis omitted).
Statements on Notre Dame's Invitation, supra note 1, at 694.
* Id. at 698.
Id. at 695 (quoting Letter from Bishop Thomas J. Olmsted, Diocese of Phx., to
Reverend John I. Jenkins, President of the Univ. of Notre Dame (Mar. 25, 2009),
available at http://the-american-catholic.com/2009/03/26/bishop-olmsted-accuses-
president-jenkins-of-disobedience/).
The question of the extent to which schools run by religious orders owe direct
"obedience" to a statement by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops-interesting,
but far beyond the scope of this introduction.
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The authors of this Symposium write two years after the
Notre Dame controversy, somewhat removed from its intense
heat and blinding spotlights. In this Symposium, two law
professors' and two philosophers,9 each on faculties at four
different catholic universities, take to heart the United States
Bishops' 2004 statement, and explore the implications of the
question whom should a Catholic law school honor. The sections
below explore some of the themes that weave throughout the
various essays.
I. CONSIDERING INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Catholics in Political Life refers generally to whom "the
Catholic community and Catholic institutions" should not
honor."o Professors Baur and Garnett both grapple with general
definitions of what it means to be a university, and in particular
a Catholic university. Professor Baur draws on the insights of
now-Blessed John Henry Cardinal Newman to note the contrast
between a university and other places of human formation.
Newman describes the university as a place where questions can
be "ventilated and turned over and over again," such that
inquirers may have some comfortable distance from "supreme
and final" authority, "watching every word," or making "signs of
assent or dissent to each sentence, as [it is] uttered."' As
distinguished from a convent or a seminary, a university is "a
direct preparation for this world[,] . . . a place to fit men of the
world for the world."12 As such, a university should also prepare
its students for the inevitable complexities of the world.
' Robert K. Vischer is a professor of law at the University of St. Thomas School
of Law in Minneapolis, Minnesota. See Robert K. Vischer, Whom Should a Catholic
Law School Honor? If Confusion Is the Concern, Context Matters, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL
STUD. 243 (2010). Richard W. Garnett is a professor of law at Notre Dame
University School of Law. See Richard W. Garnett, Whom Should a Catholic
University Honor?: "Speaking" with Integrity, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2010).
9 Karen Stohr is a professor of philosophy at Georgetown University. See Karen
Stohr, Honors, Awards, and the Catholic Moral Tradition, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD.
277 (2010). Michael Baur is a professor of philosophy at Fordham University. See
Michael Baur, The Authority To Interpret, the Purpose of Universities, and the
Giving of Awards, Honors, or Platforms by Catholic Universities: Some Thoughts on
Catholics in Political Life, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STuD. 253 (2010).
1o See Catholics in Political Life, supra note 4.
n Baur, supra note 9, at 269 (quoting JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN,
APOLOGIA PRO VITA SUA AND SIX SERMONS 341-42 (Frank M. Turner ed., 2008)).
12 Id. at 268 (quoting NEWMAN, supra note 11, at 160).
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We cannot possibly keep [students] from plunging into the
world, with all its ways and principles and maxims, when their
time comes; but we can prepare them against what is inevitable;
and it is not the way to learn to swim in troubled waters, never
to have gone into them.' 3
Many would acknowledge that these are the principles that
should inform how we imagine the space for academic discussion
and debate in a university. The sticking point is whether
troubled waters should overflow into decisions about whom the
institution itself should honor.
Working from another angle, Professor Garnett probes the
qualifier "Catholic." He highlights and contests the tendency to
presume that the descriptor "Catholic" necessarily involves
"tak[ing] something away" from the enterprise that is a
"university"-"To get a 'Catholic' university, in other words, one
subtracts from a 'university' those things that are not consistent
with its being a 'Catholic' university," so the argument goes."
What if, he queries, the "misshapen" notion of university lies not
in the "Catholic" modifier, but in the supposed norms and
touchstones of the secular models that define what it means to be
a "university"?'5 According to Professor Garnett, if "Catholic" is
defined as a positive identity rather than a subtraction, it might
help us to imagine how whom a Catholic university honors might
be an expression of its distinctive contribution to education and
academic life.
Another aspect of institutional context considers the fact
that schools also have different institutional histories, emphases,
and approaches to education. For those run by religious orders,
their varying charisms shape their approach to education and
their engagement with the culture and with social problems.
One might query how these distinct emphases would be reflected
in policies for whom to honor. For example, Professor Vischer
asks whether Xavier University in New Orleans-the only
historically Black Catholic college in the Western Hemisphere-
should be precluded from inviting Donna Brazile, the first
African American to lead a national presidential campaign, to
speak at commencement because she is pro-choice.16
's Id. (quoting NEWMAN, supra note 11, at 160).
14 Garnett, supra note 8, at 237.
16 Id. at 240.
16 See Vischer, supra note 8, at 249-50.
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A second aspect of institutional context is the extent to which
varying components of a university call for nuances in the
analysis of whom to honor. Catholic law schools, for example,
hold together a variety of values-including respect for legal
process and the rule of law. On certain crucial issues, aspects of
the rule of law are in direct tension with fundamental principles
of Catholic morality. For example, how should Catholic law
schools evaluate the actions of lower-court judges who consider
themselves bound by the rule of the law of Roe v. Wade?" The
role of precedent in judicial decision-making was one of the
complex questions that permeated the discussion regarding
Fordham Law School's decision to grant an ethics award to
Justice Stephen Breyer in 2008, notwithstanding his authorship
of Stenberg v. Carhart.18
If the constraints of various professional roles should not be
considered in the analysis of whom to honor, then it would be
important for Catholic law schools to also broach the practical
implications of the resulting bar-namely, the portion of the
judiciary which could in effect be excluded from Catholic law
school campuses, and the extent to which speakers and honors
policies communicate a clear message of withdrawal. As
Professor Stohr reflects, "The principle of cooperation recognizes
the fact that keeping one's hands perfectly clean in the messy
business of real life is not always an option. Sometimes, the
choice is between dirty hands and total withdrawal. Church
teaching does not specify a priori which choice must be made.""
A final question regarding institutional context: What
aspects of a "Catholic institution" call for intense scrutiny-only
honors bestowed by the university in its official capacity, such as
an honorary degree, or should it also extend to the various sub-
communities within the institution? For example, in a law school
context, can the student-run public interest organization, which
raises money to support summer internships, honor at their
17 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Is 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2000) (striking down Nebraska's "partial birth"
abortion ban). See generally Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Catholics in Public Life:
Judges, Legislators, and Voters, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 211, 244 (2007).
9 Stohr, supra note 9, at 290. One could also argue that it would be enough to
find ways to engage in conversation without bestowing an honor. For many schools,
this conversing would entail a significant shift in academic culture in which
engagement with high level public figures tends to include some kind of honor such
as an honorary degree-but it might be one approach well worth further exploration.
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annual fund-raising dinner the work of an anti-death penalty
advocate who also happens to be pro-choice? If so, at what point
might intense scrutiny at every level of campus conversation
interfere with academic freedom, and the kind of cultural
engagement which, as Newman described, prepares future
professionals to respectfully engage a complex world? Or are
these precisely the "practices" that will help Catholic universities
find their unique voice and contribution to the academic
landscape?2 0
II. DEFINING "DEFIANCE"
Considering the Catholics in Political Life phrase "those who
act in defiance," the context of the 2004 statement suggests two
additional layers of complexity."' First, how does one define
"defiance" of Church teaching if the speaker in question is not
Catholic? 22  Some suggest that because Church teaching on
"fundamental moral principles" is expressed in terms accessible
to non-Catholics, and is directed at our society as a whole, it is
clear that "defiance" should be given a general application.2 3
Others, including Father Jenkins, read "defiance" in the context
of one's relationship to Church authority.24
Professor Baur's analysis is especially helpful for parsing the
multi-layered question of authority to interpret definitions in a
church document. As Professor Baur explains, the meaning of a
word within a church document, such as a statement from the
Bishop's conference, is to be settled by the local bishop:
20 See Garnett, supra note 8, at 237.
21 Catholics in Political Life, supra note 4.
22 See id.
21 See Vischer, supra note 8, at 244 (noting that because the Church's teaching is
addressed to people of good will, especially the teaching on abortion, "defiance"
should be read as disagreement with the truths proclaimed in the teaching, not as a
battle with an authority to which one is bound by one's own identity as Catholic).
24 See Kathleen Gilbert, Leaked: ND Prez Comment on USCCB Document
Prohibiting Honoring Pro-Abortion Politicians, LIFESITENEWS.COM (Apr. 8, 2009),
http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archivelldn/2009/apr/09040808 (quoting Catholics
in Political Life, supra note 4) (statement of Father Jenkins) ("Because the title of
the document is 'Catholics in Political Life,' we understood this to refer to honoring
Catholics whose actions are not in accord with our moral principles. This
interpretation was supported by canon lawyers we consulted, who advised us that,
by definition, only Catholics who implicitly recognize the authority of Church
teaching can act in 'defiance' of it.").
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Thus, if the bishop of the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend
declares that the word "defiance," as contained in the bishops'
statement, pertains to both Catholics and non-Catholics, then
that declaration is the correct one and ought to be followed by
anyone seeking to understand the bishops' statement as it
applies within the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend.
Definitions of terms, however, do not mark the end of the
inquiry. Professor Baur distinguishes the authority to define
terms from the authority to determine how those terms apply in
particular circumstances. The local bishop does not have unique
and exclusive authority to determine whether or not these terms
refer to particular actions in the natural world, for that is the
world about which we-as rational beings-may all reasonably
discourse.2 6
Considering the specificity of a law school context, the
definition of "defiance" might also be informed by the contours of
one's professional or social role. For example, one might
distinguish between politicians who are called to take a precise
stand on particular issues as recorded by their voting records-
although this, too, is complex-and those who serve other
functions, whose positions on controversial issues may be less
evident and may have less impact. In the legal profession, one
might also distinguish between judges who are required to follow
the rule of law and advocates who choose to hone in on particular
issues. Many potential honorees are in the "messy middle."
Professor Stohr suggests that we have a particularly hard case
"where the person has not taken on abortion rights advocacy as a
major commitment but has also not explicitly rejected or opposed
abortion rights."7
Others are in the messy middle to the extent that they can
be honored for some but not all aspects of their life or their work.
Where should one start drawing the line on the demand for
consistency with Church teaching? If the potential honoree is
Catholic, how should an institution evaluate aspects of one's
personal life? For example, if Rudy Giuliani were pro-life, should
his marital status as being divorced and remarried preclude him
from receiving an honor for his public accomplishments at a
Catholic university? If the demand for complete integrity is
25 Baur, supra note 9, at 259.
26 Id. at 259-62.
2 Stohr, supra note 9, at 288.
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taken to an extreme, at what point would the answer to the
question "whom should a Catholic university honor?" be
"nobody"?28 Yet for institutions that claim to educate the "whole
person," at what point is a decision to bifurcate public and
private-honoring only certain aspects of a person's life, while
expressing a certain distance on other aspects-a sad surrender
of an important ideal?
The Catholic philosophical and theological tradition does
provide some equipment for beginning to navigate these
questions. As Professor Stohr explains, one of the primary
concerns at stake is the question of whether a Catholic
institution gives "scandal" to the faithful." Technically, she
explains, "[s]candal is an attitude or behavior which leads
another to do evil." 0 She argues that the danger is not so much
that the honor will have an "actual[] deleterious effect[ I" on the
beliefs or actions of those who witness the honor-such as a
weakening of moral convictions, or an increase that one would
engage in immoral behavior.31 Her concern is with scandal in a
less technical and slightly more attenuated sense-grounded in
the moral importance of distancing oneself from the actions
properly regarded as wrong.32
Professor Vischer adds an additional layer of complexity to
the concern about "scandal." He notes that the Bishops' 2007
guide, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship identifies not
one but two "'temptations'" in public life.33  The first is to
consider the evil of the "'direct and intentional destruction
of... human life'" as just one issue among many.34 The second
is to misuse "'these necessary moral distinctions as a way of
dismissing or ignoring other serious threats to human life and
dignity.' "as For Professor Vischer, scandal, in its broader and
less technical usage, is a two-way street: On one hand, one must
28 See Garnett, supra note 8, at 234.
2 Stohr, supra note 9, at 280.
30 Id. (quoting CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2284 (2d ed. 1997)).
at Id. at 281.
32 Id.
3 Vischer, supra note 8, at 248 (quoting U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship 9 (2007) [hereinafter
Forming Consciences], available at http://www.usccb.org/faithfulcitizenship/
FCStatement.pdf).
34 Id. (quoting Forming Consciences, supra note 33).
31 Id. (quoting Forming Consciences, supra note 33).
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be aware of the potential for certain honors to generate confusion
about church teaching on matters of the utmost moral
importance for our culture today. On the other hand, one must
also keep in mind the risk of "a different sort of scandal by
portraying the culture-transforming scope of Church teaching in
misleadingly narrow terms."
Professor Baur zeroes in on another philosophical and
theological resource: the principle of "double effect"-the question
of "the moral difficulties that arise when our pursuit of [the] good
is bound up with [the] causing [ofJ evil," as St. Thomas Aquinas
recognized. Professor Baur suggests that this doctrine might be
helpful in parsing whether there might be proportionate reasons
for granting honors in some circumstances, notwithstanding the
consequent evil.39
III. TIMING AS ALMOST EVERYTHING?
As noted above, timing was an important aspect of the Notre
Dame crisis. The decision to honor President Obama was
announced within a fairly short time after Catholic communities
across the nation had experienced intense polarization over
whether Catholics could in good conscience vote for Barack
Obama in spite of his pro-choice positions. Although much less
in the limelight, the critique of Fordham's decision to honor
Justice Stephen Breyer almost certainly gained particular
traction in light of the award's timing, in the heat of the 2008
presidential campaign.
Professor Vischer discusses timing-both historically and in
cultural context-within the stretch of a particular person's life.
He queries:
Would a Catholic law school's decision to honor pro-choice
President Carter in 1977 pose a different risk of confusion than
honoring pro-choice President Obama in 2009? .. . Would
honoring pro-choice President Carter pose a different level of
" Id. at 251.
17 Id. See also John R. Quinn, The Public Duty of Bishops, AMERICA, Aug. 31,
2009, at 18, 19 (Archbishop emeritus describing how a "strategy of condemnation"
risks "communicat[ing] several false and unintended messages to much of American
society").
3 Baur, supra note 9, at 272.
" See id. at 275.
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concern than honoring-still pro-choice-former President
Carter, now known widely for his post-Presidency work
promoting affordable housing?40
Whether an honor should be considered as suggesting
"support" for actions in defiance of fundamental moral principles
invites a highly contextual analysis. Timing is an important and,
in some circumstances, a defining feature of that context.
CONCLUSION
As each author admits, what emerges from these reflections
is not a series of answers, but a set of further questions. We hope
these analyses will be helpful in the continuing discussion on the
principles that should inform decisions about commencement
speakers and other honors in Catholic law schools and Catholic
universities."
40 Vischer, supra note 8, at 249.
41 See generally Daniel R. Suhr, Lessons for Law School Deans Regarding
Catholics in Political Life, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POLY 395 (2010).
232
